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DON’T BE SO IMPATIENT
Gerard N. Magliocca*

INTRODUCTION
Sir Humphrey Appleby: If you want to be really sure that the Minister
doesn’t accept [a proposal], you must say the decision is “courageous.”
Bernard Woolley: And that’s worse than “controversial”?
Sir Humphrey Appleby: Oh, yes! “Controversial” only means “this will lose
you votes.” “Courageous” means “this will lose you the election!”
Yes Minister1

This dialogue from the best television comedy on politics captures the
question that drives this symposium: Is gridlock the product of elected officials who cannot make tough choices or an electorate that cannot agree
about what should be done? While there is one important structural barrier—the Senate filibuster—that should be lowered to facilitate congressional action, my Essay argues that the current stalemate is just a phase that
will pass. People are sometimes badly split in a healthy democracy, and
papering over those divisions by manipulating the political process is justified
only under extreme conditions that are absent today.
Part I explores four definitions of gridlock and concludes that the best
one holds that the present electorate does not agree on major issues in an
unusual way that prevents compromise. Part II holds that there is no acceptable legal cure for a fractured Congress that is (broadly speaking) accurately
representing a torn nation. Like the common law, public opinion just needs
time to work itself pure.
 2013 Gerard N. Magliocca. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the authors, provides a citation to the Notre Dame
Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Samuel R. Rosen Professor, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law.
I would like to thank the organizers of the Symposium, especially Erinn Rigney, for inviting
me to participate.
1 Yes Minister: The Right to Know (BBC television broadcast Mar. 31, 1980). Sir
Humphrey Appleby was the Permanent Secretary (the top civil servant) in the fictional
Ministry of Administrative Affairs, and Bernard Woolley was the Principal Private Secretary
to the Minister, Jim Hacker. Id.
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WHAT IS GRIDLOCK?

There are at least four reasonable interpretations of what people mean
when they say that there is gridlock: (1) there is a national consensus on an
issue, but our political structure prevents that view from being enacted; (2)
there is a consensus among political elites about a course of action, but party
loyalty stymies compromise; (3) political elites are deadlocked, but only
because the voting system distorts public opinion; and (4) the nation is genuinely divided and our politicians reflect that view. The first three of these
ideas are explored and rejected, while the fourth is defended and explained.
A.

Procedural Gridlock

One common refrain is that gridlock is a disease caused by a constitutional institution or practice that gives legislative minorities too much
power.2 In this context, “too much” means that a broad and robust popular
majority is repeatedly blocked from changing policy in Congress. During the
late-nineteenth century, this concern was centered on the Senate, which was
not popularly elected,3 and on the House of Representatives, which had rules
that gave the minority wide latitude to frustrate the majority through procedural tactics.4 In response, the Seventeenth Amendment was ratified in 1913
to make the Senate more representative,5 and the House reformed its rules
in the 1890s to make minority obstruction virtually impossible.6
The modern wellspring of procedural gridlock is the Senate’s custom of
allowing forty-one of its members to stop most legislation and executive
nominations with little effort. In an essay published in 2011, I wrote (drawing on the work of others) that this is a relatively new way of doing business.7
For most of the Senate’s history, the filibuster was reserved for bills considered in a lame duck session of Congress or for one very controversial topic—
civil rights.8 Starting in the 1970s, though, the Senate moved towards a norm
2 See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 25–77 (2006)
(offering an extended critique of the Constitution’s provisions with respect to Congress).
3 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend XVII (“The Senate of
the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each state, [chosen by the Legislature thereof] . . . .”).
4 See generally JAMES GRANT, MR. SPEAKER!: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THOMAS B. REED
(2011) (describing the range of dilatory tactics used in the House during the 1880s).
5 See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed
of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years . . . .”).
6 See Josh Chafetz, The Unconstitutionality of the Filibuster, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1003,
1025–26 (2011) (describing the so-called “Reed Rules” that streamlined House
procedures).
7 See Gerard N. Magliocca, Reforming the Filibuster, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 303, 308–13
(2011). This is an important point because other structural criticisms of the Constitution,
such as the fact that we have a bicameral legislature or a Senate that is not apportioned
according to population, are not new and therefore cannot be blamed for any recent
upsurge in gridlock.
8 See id.; see also John Copeland Nagle, Lame Duck Logic, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1177,
1218 (2012) (“Filibusters actually preserve the will of the majority of the people during
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that almost all pending items could be filibustered and that a refusal to
invoke cloture (the motion bringing debate to an end) did not require the
minority to hold the floor continuously.9 Thus, the minority’s power within
the Senate is now at an all-time high because filibusters are no longer considered exceptional and are easy to maintain.
There is no doubt in my mind that the filibuster should be restored to
something closer to its original form—a device to delay rather than defeat—
but this will not completely solve the problem of gridlock.10 A more
majoritarian Senate does not promote bipartisan cooperation. If anything,
the filibuster encourages consensus by forcing the parties to agree. Nor does
filibuster reform resolve the paralysis that occurs when one party has the
White House and the other holds all or part of Congress, as has been the case
since 2011.
B.

Party Gridlock

Another understanding of gridlock could rest on a view that our representatives are not as brave as their forefathers. In a past golden age, the story
goes, the United States possessed statesmen who soared above party squabbles and made unpopular choices for the greater good.11 Now members of
Congress know what must be done but fail to act because they care more
about partisan advantage or personal vendettas. As a legal historian who
spends a lot of time studying politics, I can confidently say that this is a myth.
The public servants of today are no worse, and are probably better, than they
were in the 1800s or in the 1900s.12
A more nuanced version of this “party before country” idea is that partisan loyalty blocks like-minded members of Congress from bargaining. Let us
compare two hypotheticals. In the first scenario, Senator A and Senator B
have different preferences but belong to the same party caucus. In the other
scenario, these same senators belong to different parties. The costs of negotiating are higher in the second example. Why? Presumably because there is a
stigma attached to reaching across the aisle (at least on high-profile issues).
The party whips often discourage this sort of collaboration, and primary votlame-duck sessions because they prevent Congress from acting after the People have
elected new representatives.”).
9 See Magliocca, supra note 7, at 313–16; see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 365 (2012) (“In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, routine filibustering practices have skyrocketed.”).
10 My proposal is that the Senate filibuster should be changed into a suspensory veto,
much like the one held by the British House of Lords, which would let the minority delay
pending business for only a limited period of time (for example, one year during a given
Congress). See Magliocca, supra note 7, at 316–23.
11 See generally JOHN F. KENNEDY, PROFILES IN COURAGE (1955) (providing the most
hyperbolic version of this story).
12 The enactment of the financial bailout by a Democratic Congress and a Republican
President in 2008 is a good recent example, as that was definitely not popular but was
necessary.
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ers punish members who stray too often from the party line. This did not
used to be true to the same degree. What changed?
The answer is that the parties are now more ideologically homogenous.
As Rick Pildes explains in a convincing article, this development can be
traced to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which ended one-party rule in the
South and undermined the Civil War legacy that gave both parties a strong
conservative and liberal wing.13 Prior to that realignment, there were many
members of Congress in each party with overlapping views, and bipartisanship was not seen as a grave flaw. Party labels and loyalty mattered less.
Today there is much less overlap between the most conservative Democrat
and the most liberal Republican, and party identification within Congress
matters a great deal.14 Put another way, there are fewer people who agree
with the views of the other party, and there is more pressure against coalition
building. That is not because of a sudden decline in leadership, but the party
system of our parents is not coming back.15 As a result, we must look elsewhere to solve the gridlock problem.
C.

Electoral Gridlock

A related explanation of gridlock is that our voting system is exacerbating party polarization.16 In other words, the cure for a party system that is
too rigid involves reengineering the electoral rules so that they do a better
job of representing the country as a whole. For instance, states could insist
on open primaries instead of closed ones, with the idea that a broader voting
pool would elect more centrist candidates. Or states could reform districts
that are gerrymandered into safe House seats for one party or the other,
which will produce members who are more strident. California is trying a
more radical experiment by providing that the top two vote getters (regard-

13 See Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CAL. L. REV. 273, 276 (2011) (“[T]his polarization reflects a maturation
of American democracy, rather than a state that should be considered temporary or
aberrational.”).
14 See THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS 45
(2012) (presenting this conclusion with the support of extensive data).
15 In a sense, one could say that the problem is not that the congressional parties are
too disciplined, but that they are not disciplined enough. If Barack Obama and John
Boehner could just make a deal and force their supporters in Congress to march in lockstep, then gridlock would only be an obstacle if party leaders did not get along. Alas, our
politicians cannot expect the obedience that would be commonplace within a parliamentary system.
16 Campaign finance regulation (or the lack thereof) could be part of the problem.
See Citizens United v. Fed. Elec. Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (barring limits on most
campaign expenditures by corporations). But there is not enough empirical evidence to
draw a conclusion. Moreover, the gridlock problem predates Citizens United, so that decision cannot be the cause.
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less of party affiliation) in a primary advance to the general election,17 which
is getting closer to eliminating the party primary entirely.18
While there is some merit in these proposals, they rely on the questionable premise that when the “real voters” show up they will elect members of
Congress who will work together more often. But that is probably just wishful
thinking. Partisanship in the Senate is increasing19 even though Senate seats
cannot be gerrymandered and the electorate that chooses most Senators is
far larger than for House members. Years of polling data also suggest that
there is something real behind the idea that there are red-state and blue-state
voters who are not inclined to renounce their differences.20 I do not believe
that this is a stable equilibrium, but the point is that there is no convincing
proof that the voting system is significantly misrepresenting the state of public opinion and creating gridlock.21
D.

Actual Gridlock

We are now driven to a final explanation—Congress cannot get many
things done because the voters that they represent do not agree on what
should be done. This is straightforward enough, but there is one wrinkle
that deserves attention. Our political system may really be suffering from too
little gridlock rather than too much. Each party is refusing to budge from its
principles because it believes that it can win unified control of Congress and
17 Norimitsu Onishi, New Rules Upend House Re-Election Races in California, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 25, 2012, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/25/us/politics/newrules-upend-house-re-election-races-in-california.html.
18 See, e.g., William B. Jackson, Note, A Blanket Too Short and Too Narrow: California’s
Nonpartisan Blanket Primary, 23 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 535 (2012) (describing the operation
of Proposition 14). Louisiana has used a system like this for years. See Chenwei Zhang,
Note, Towards a More Perfect Election: Improving the Top-Two Primary for Congressional and State
Races, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 615, 625 (2012).
19 See Pildes, supra note 13, at 276–78.
20 Lydia Saad, In the U.S., Blue States Outnumber Red States, 20 to 12, GALLUP (Jan. 30,
2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/160175/blue-states-outnumber-red-states.aspx
(presenting polling data on the entrenchment of red and blue states).
21 In fairness, Republicans retained their majority in the House of Representatives in
2012 even though Democrats received more votes in House races across the country.
Aaron Blake, Democratic House Candidates Winning the Popular Vote, Despite Big GOP Majority,
WASH. POST THE FIX BLOG (Nov. 9, 2012, 11:52 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/the-fix/wp/2012/11/09/democratic-house-candidates-winning-the-popular-votedespite-big-gop-majority/. This odd result has occurred before and seems to reflect the
distribution of votes rather than gerrymandering (in other words, there are more lopsided
Democratic districts), though this is not clear. Another factor is that the House is malapportioned since each state is entitled to one member even though a perfectly proportional
formula would assign less than one member to the smallest states. See generally Jeffrey W.
Ladewig, One Person, One Vote, 435 Seats: Interstate Malapportionment and Constitutional
Requirements, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1125 (2011) (explaining this problem).
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the White House soon.22 As long as that is a viable hope, there is no incentive to make a deal.23
In recent years, party turnover in Washington has been a frequent event.
For instance, in 2000 Republicans narrowly won the Presidency and a majority in Congress.24 In 2001, however, the Senate switched to the Democrats
when James Jeffords of Vermont changed parties.25 A year later, the Senate
returned to Republican hands.26 Then in 2006, the Democrats captured
both houses of Congress.27 Two years after that, President Obama prevailed,
but in 2010 Republicans swept back into the House of Representatives.28
Contrast all of this with the state of affairs from 1981 to 1993. During that
span, Republicans held the White House and Democrats controlled the
House the entire time.29
The irony is that institutional party stability, which was the norm prior to
2000 and may be here again following the results in 2010 and 2012, reduces
gridlock by lowering the expectations of both sides.30 When each party has a
power base that is circumscribed for the foreseeable future, legislative bargains become more attractive. When the chances of getting everything that
you want are nil, getting some of what you want becomes the best option.
The problem prior to 2012 is that both parties believed based on recent history and on polls that they could have it all if they just waited two years.31
Until that belief is dispelled, there is no reason for them to accept less.
Accordingly, the current level of inaction in Congress is a rational response
to voter preferences and the rules of the game. While those rules can and
should be improved, that will not end gridlock. What, then, should be done
to bring voters together?
22 The possibility of filibuster reform increases this temptation. If people thought that
they would clearly need sixty senators to do anything, then they would probably give up any
hope of achieving total victory.
23 In effect, there are two ways of thinking about political concessions. They could be
a product of high-minded self-sacrifice, or they could be the product of sheer exhaustion.
The latter is more realistic.
24 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE 2012 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT: THE NATIONAL DATA BOOK,
ELECTIONS: CONGRESSIONAL, tbl.411 (2012) [hereinafter ELECTIONS: CONGRESSIONAL],
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0411.pdf.
25 See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the
Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 968 n.203 (2008) (noting the Jeffords
switch).
26 ELECTIONS: CONGRESSIONAL, supra note 24.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Recall that the Democrats controlled the House of Representatives from 1954 to
1994, which is an astounding result by modern standards. U.S. HOUSE OF REP.: HISTORY,
ART & ARCHIVES, PARTY DIVISIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://history.house.
gov/Institution/Party-Divisions/Party-Divisions/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2013).
31 This belief is not true for a President in his second term, as he has only a few more
years to establish his legacy, but it is true for his party.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-5\NDL505.txt

2013]

unknown

Seq: 7

don’t be so impatient

2-JUL-13

12:17

2163

II. CONJURING CONSENSUS
In the movie Chinatown, J.J. Gittes explains that when he was a policeman he was advised to do “as little as possible” in a neighborhood where
nobody knows the truth.32 That is the same advice that should apply to most
efforts to fix gridlock. When public opinion is split, the best response is to
change hearts and minds through ordinary persuasion. Anything more than
that involves slanting the playing field to get an outcome rather than letting
that result develop on its own.33 Such an approach violates basic principles
of self-government and is justified only in a dire emergency. Lawyers are
used to waiting a long time for the common law to find coherence; the same
virtue is required for democratic politics.
The most prominent era in which representation rules were changed to
obscure voter preferences was Reconstruction.34 People who praise bipartisanship must acknowledge that the ratification of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments was a highly partisan process supported
by only one party.35 While Republicans may have been a majority in the
country, they lacked support (among whites) in the former rebel states and
did not have universal support in the North. Under a normal process, no
constitutional amendment could have won the support of two-thirds of each
house of Congress as required by Article V.36 The Republican leadership
responded in 1865 by excluding the southern Congressmen and Senators—
who were all Democrats—to create a supermajority.37 In one fell swoop,
gridlock turned into a Republican juggernaut.
Excluding politicians who would definitely vote the “wrong” way was
strong medicine, but in the aftermath of the Civil War that decision was
appropriate. First, the Union could not readmit the ex-rebels without some
real assurances of good faith. Second, African-Americans could not vote in
these southern states, which undercut the democratic credentials of any
members elected there. Third, the abolition of slavery actually increased the
ranks of ex-secessionists in Congress because non-voting African-Americans
counted as a full person instead of as three-fifths of one for enumeration
32 See CHINATOWN (Paramount Pictures 1974). Of course, Gittes does not take this
advice in the movie, with tragic consequences.
33 For an example of a state legislature where gridlock was eliminated, see Gerard N.
Magliocca, Huey P. Long and the Guarantee Clause, 83 TUL. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2008) (describing the Louisiana legislature of the early 1930s where bills were passed “at the rate of one
every few minutes”).
34 I examine these issues in my forthcoming biography on the author of the Equal
Protection Clause. See GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, AMERICAN FOUNDING SON: JOHN BINGHAM
AND THE INVENTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (forthcoming 2013).
35 See AMAR, supra note 9, at 398–400 (discussing how the Republican Party moved
these amendments through Congress over total Democratic opposition).
36 See U.S. CONST. art. V. Moreover, Congress would have been unable to override the
vetoes of President Andrew Johnson, who was a strong critic of Republican Reconstruction.
See John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction Amendments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 375,
404–05 (2001).
37 Harrison, supra note 36, at 399–400.
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purposes.38 As a result, the gridlock that would have resulted if the South
had returned in force to the Capitol would have rested on an illegitimate
foundation inconsistent with the outcome of the war.39
Needless to say, no equivalent crisis confronts us in 2013, and therefore
we must look to other precedents. Our present stalemate looks unusual
because it comes in a partisan package, but Congress has been deadlocked
on key issues before. One vivid example is the stalemate between internationalists and isolationists that lasted from the end of World War One until
the bombing of Pearl Harbor.40 This was a debate that crossed party lines,
and congressional inaction had dreadful consequences for the world.41 The
civil rights movement is another example, as Republican and Democratic
friends of equality were frustrated for decades by their inability to get legislation passed that was vital to the freedom of so many citizens.42 Why should
we expect to fail where they ultimately succeeded?
The common law method that all lawyers learn provides the most helpful analogy. It typically takes a long time for the cases in a given area to
coalesce around a clear or workable rule. This is a very inefficient process,
but it has the advantage of airing a wide variety of views by a broad swath of
the legal elite.43 Consequently, whatever emerges tends to have broad support from that constituency. In the meantime, attorneys, judges, and scholars just cope with uncertainty and do their best to shape the conversation.
Legislatures can, of course, cut this process short by passing a statute, but that
could produce a hasty or incomplete answer to a complex question.
A similar thought should govern our attitude toward public opinion and
its expression in Congress. Deadlock that is the result of a divided electorate
is not really different from splits in case law that are the result of disagreements among lawyers. Nobody, however, is organizing a symposium on how
to solve the stalemate between, say, originalists and living constitutionalists.
Instead, the assumption is that some consensus will eventually come from
that debate. Why is Congress any different from the courts?
38 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (containing the Three-Fifths Clause), amended by U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; see also Harrison, supra note 36, at 400–01.
39 The failure of Reconstruction to achieve many of its aims for nearly one hundred
years, though, suggests that evasions of public opinion, no matter how wrong that opinion
may be, are probably doomed.
40 See, e.g., DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, NO ORDINARY TIME 22–23 (1994) (offering a
sketch of the debate between internationalists and isolationists).
41 Part of this congressional deadlock was caused by a structural flaw—the Constitution’s requirement that a supermajority of the Senate was required to ratify any major
international agreement. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. But there was also a very real
and very intense divide in America about getting involved in Europe. Even Pearl Harbor
did not resolve that debate; only Hitler’s declaration of war against us did.
42 See generally ROBERT MANN, THE WALLS OF JERICHO: LYNDON JOHNSON, HUBERT
HUMPHREY, RICHARD RUSSELL, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (1996) (describing this
long march for justice).
43 Granted, this comparison is not comforting if you think that problems such as our
national debt or climate change are urgent.
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CONCLUSION
The right not to agree is fundamental. Though there are costs to congressional paralysis and filibuster reform is essential to protect the majority
party’s right to legislate, aggressive action to transcend partisan divisions in
the country would be unwise.
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